(No Brute Force, No Rate Limits Bypassed – Educational Case Study)
Disclaimer
This article is strictly for educational and defensive learning purposes.
The application, flows, endpoints, and responses are fully anonymized.
No real service was harmed, and this content demonstrates how logic mistakes—not hacking tools—break authentication systems.
Why Login Systems Fail (Even With “Security”)
Most developers believe a login system is secure if it has:
- Rate limiting ✅
- CAPTCHA ✅
- Strong passwords ✅
- MFA (sometimes) ✅
What they forget is logic.
🔑 A login system can be cryptographically perfect and still be completely broken.
This post shows how I logged in as another user
➡️ without guessing passwords
➡️ without brute force
➡️ without exploiting the database
Just by abusing how the system thinks.
Target Overview (Anonymized)
- Type: Consumer web application
- Auth flow:
- Password
- OTP verification (email-based)
- Security controls present:
- Rate limiting
- Account lockout
- CAPTCHA after failures
On paper? Secure.
In reality? Fragile.
Phase 1: Mapping the Login Flow (Critical Step)
Instead of attacking /login directly, I mapped the entire flow:
- Submit email + password
- Server responds: “OTP sent to your email”
- Submit OTP
- Login success
This is important:
Any multi-step flow is a logic attack surface
Phase 2: Observing State Handling
I opened DevTools → Network and watched each step.
Step 1 Response (after password):
{
"status": "OTP_REQUIRED",
"session_id": "a9f3c1e2"
}
🚩 Red Flag #1:
Authentication state is tracked using a client-side session ID.
Phase 3: Testing Assumptions (Always Question “Required”)
The app said OTP was required.
But did the backend enforce it?
I tried something simple.
Phase 4: Skipping the OTP Step Entirely
Instead of submitting OTP, I sent this request manually:
POST /api/auth/complete HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
{
"session_id": "a9f3c1e2"
}
Response:
{
"token": "eyJhbGciOi..."
}
😐
No OTP.
No validation.
No error.
I was logged in.
Why This Worked (Important)
The backend logic was:
IF session_id exists
→ issue token
Instead of:
IF session_id exists AND otp_verified == true
→ issue token
This is not a coding bug.
This is a logic flaw.
Phase 5: Expanding the Attack Surface
Now I tested other variations.
Case 1: Wrong Password + OTP Step
- Submitted wrong password
- Still received
session_id - OTP flow triggered anyway
That means:
Password correctness was not enforced before OTP
Phase 6: Account Takeover Scenario
Here’s the full attack chain:
Step-by-step Attack
1️⃣ Enter victim’s email
2️⃣ Enter any password
3️⃣ Receive session_id
4️⃣ Skip OTP verification
5️⃣ Call /auth/complete
6️⃣ Get valid auth token
Result:
Full account access without credentials
Phase 7: Confirming With Another Account
I repeated the attack using:
- A fresh account
- Different emails
- Different browsers
Same result.
This confirmed it wasn’t:
- Session confusion
- Cache issue
- Race condition
It was systemic.
Why Rate Limiting & CAPTCHA Didn’t Help
| Security Control | Why It Failed |
|---|---|
| Rate limiting | No brute force used |
| CAPTCHA | Login attempt was “valid” |
| Account lockout | No failed attempts |
| OTP | Never actually required |
Security features mean nothing if logic is broken.
Root Cause Analysis
❌ Developer Mistakes
- Trusted frontend flow enforcement
- Didn’t bind OTP verification to auth state
- Treated steps independently instead of atomically
✅ How This Should Be Built
Authentication must be stateful and atomic.
Correct approach:
if not session.otp_verified:
deny_login()
Even better:
- Store auth state server-side
- Use short-lived, signed state tokens
- Invalidate session if steps are skipped
How I Hunt Login Logic Bugs (My Exact Method)
This is the playbook:
1️⃣ Break the flow
- Skip steps
- Reorder steps
- Replay steps
2️⃣ Reuse identifiers
- session_id
- temp_token
- state param
3️⃣ Change inputs
- Wrong password
- Correct OTP
- No OTP
4️⃣ Observe assumptions
- “This step always happens”
- “User can’t reach this endpoint”
Attack those assumptions.
Tools Used
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Browser DevTools | Flow observation |
| Burp Suite | Step manipulation |
| Repeater | State abuse |
| Brain | Main exploit engine |
Severity & Impact
This vulnerability allows:
- 🔓 Full account takeover
- 🔑 Bypass MFA entirely
- 📩 Access private data
- 💸 Financial abuse
Severity:
Critical (Authentication Bypass)
This is worse than SQLi in many cases.
Why These Bugs Are Everywhere
Because developers:
- Focus on features, not flows
- Test happy paths only
- Assume users behave correctly
Attackers don’t.
Defensive Checklist (For Developers)
- ✅ Enforce step order server-side
- ✅ Bind auth state to verified conditions
- ✅ Expire incomplete sessions
- ✅ Treat login as a single transaction
- ❌ Never trust frontend “required” steps
Final Thoughts
You didn’t need:
- Password cracking
- Exploit kits
- Malware
- Advanced tools
You needed logic.
That’s why logic flaws are the highest-paid bug bounty class.
